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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a corporation; MOUNTAIN
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, a corporation; and UTAH POWER &
LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
12310

OGDEN CITY, a Body Corporate and
Politic under the Laws of the State
of Utah,
Defendant-Respondent.

Reply Brief of Appellants
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by
Appellants to determine the validity of certain taxing
ordinances adopted by Respondent in violation of the express terms of the franchise agreements previously entered
into by Respondent with Appellants.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Upon a stipulation of facts and written memorandums filed with the court without oral argument, the
court below entered judgment according Appellants no
cause for action, the Appellants' complaint was dismissed
and the following conclusions of law were made by the
court:
1. The franchises that were granted by the
defendant Ogden City to the plaintiffs, and are the
subject of this action are not valid for the purpose
of predetermining the tax liability of the plaintiffs
or the subscribers of the plaintiffs, and the provisions of said franchises which purport to do so
are ultra vires acts, and those sections are void.
The defendant's Ordinance No. 10-69, the additional Utility Revenue Tax is valid as applied
to the plaintiffs.
2. The defendant has made a reasonable
classification in its ordinance number 10-69 in that
defendant has selected from within the class of
public utilities a sub-class which is defineable and
distinguishable from other sub-classes.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment below on
the grounds that such judgment is based upon erroneous
conclusions of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are adequately set forth
first brief filed herein.
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Appellants

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RESPONDENT, OGDEN CITY, HAD THE
POWER TO BIND ITSELF TO THE "IN LIEU" PROVISIONS IN THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS.
Because of the extensive amicus curiae brief filed by
Salt Lake City Corporation in an attempt to overshadow
the clear authority set forth in the brief of Appellants it
is felt that a reply brief is appropriate.
The briefs of Respondent and Salt Lake City present
a hodgepodge of cases and other authorities which purport to stand for the general rule that in the absence of
express statutory provision, a municipality's governing
body may not by contract limit the governmental functions or powers of future governing bodies of the municipality.
Not one single case cited in such briefs, however,
involves a fact situation even similar to this case. In not
one of these cases was a provision in a public utility franchise contract limiting the amount of license taxes payable
by the contracting public utility struck down pursuant to
such general rule. Attempting to make tenuous analogies from the holdings of dissimilar cases or relying on
broad dictum of courts or commentators, as is done in
these briefs, is a poor substitute for analyzing cases such
as the following three unanimous decisions which deal
directly with facts and issues substantially identical with
those before the court in the case at bar: City of Detroit v.
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Detroit City Ry., 76 Mich. 421, 43 N.W. 447 (1889); De.
troit Citizens' St. Ry v. Common Council of City of Detroit,
125 Mich. 673, 85 N.W. 96 (1901); City of North Las
Vegas v. Central Telephone Co., 85 Nev. 620, 460 P.2d
835 0969). See the discussion of these two Michigan and
one Nevada case and other supporting authorities in Ap.
pellant's first brief.
As additional supporting authority, see City of New
York v. Second Ave. R.R., 32 N.Y. 261 (1865); City of
New York v. Third Ave. R.R., 33 N.Y. 42 (1865). The
court in the latter case states at page 42 of its opinion:
The increase of the sum payable as a license·
fee, under the ordinance of 1858, beyond the
amount provided for by the stipulations in the
[franchise] contract of 1853, so far as it was in
derogation of the [railroad public utility] defendant's rights, must be deemed illegal and void. It
was not the exercise of the power of municipal
regulation, reserved by the terms of the grant, and
which the common council [of the City of New
York] had no authority to alienate; but it was
simply an attempt by one of the parties to a contract to revoke a provision inserted for the benefit of the other.
A.

General Law

Regardless of the authorities cited by Respondent and
Salt Lake City involving the power of municipal bodies to
contract in respect to governmental powers in general, it
is readily apparent that courts have not viewed a munici·
pality's taxing power in the same light as its police power
and its power of eminent domain. Upon reading Annot.,
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Tax Exemptions and the Contract Clause, 173 A.L.R. 15
( 1948), and the cases cited therein, one cannot help but
be overwhelmed by the enormous weight of authority that
supports the rule that a state or its subdivisions can by
contract limit their taxing power, and the three cases from
Michigan and Nevada cited above are examples of situations where such rule has been applied to nearly identical
facts as exist in the present case. On pages 31, 32, and
33 of said annotation we read:
. . . [T]he courts have held, specifically and
repeatedly, that the police power and that of eminent domain are inalienable, cannot be bargained
or bartered away by the state or subdivisions by
contract, and generally speaking, are not within
the contemplation of the contract clause because
contracts are made subject to the understanding
and condition that such powers are not susceptible
of elimination by contract and may be exercised
in the future. And for over one hundred years,
although unsuccessfully, eminent members of the
bench of the Federal Supreme Court, lower Federal courts, and various state courts, have strenuously urged that since the taxing power is, in
essence, of the same nature as the police power and
that of eminent domain, it, too, is incapable of
being made the subject of a "contract" by one
legislature so as to bind the hands of future legislative bodies. . . .
Although the force of these arguments has
frequently been admitted, . . . the doctrine [that
a contract of tax exemption can constitute a contract protected by the United States Constitution]
has withstood all the assaults made upon it for
over a century, and remains firmly established as
the law of the United States. The courts have repeatedly stated that the matter is settled that the
5

quesion is not an open one, and that the Federal
Supreme Court, the final arbiter of constitutional
questions such as one as to whether there is a contract and whether it has been impaired, has foreclosed speculation. (footnotes omitted).
The only contentions, therefore, which are raised in
the breifs filed by the two cities in this case which merit a
reply are, first, the suggestion that in order for the "in
lieu" clauses contained in the subject franchise agreements to be upheld, statutory or constitutional authority
must be found which authorizes them to make such an
agreement and, second, the suggestion that there are no
constitutional or statutory provisions which so authorize
Respondent.
B.

Utah Constitutional and Statutory Law

Contrary to such suggestions, Utah statutory and
constitutional provisions from which such authority can
be found are cited and discussed at length in the brief of
Appellants, thus rendering moot the question of whether
or not such authority is required. Utah Const. art. XII,
§ 8; Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14 (Supp. 1969); Utah Code
Ann.§ 10-8-20 (1962); Utah Code Ann.§ 10-8-21 (1962);
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 (1962).
Utah Const. art. XII, § 8 and Utah Code Ann. §
10-8-14 (Supp. 1969), hereinafter referred to, provide as
follows:
No law shall be passed granting the right to
construct and operate a street railroad, telegraph,
telephone or electric light plant within any city or
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incorporated town, without the consent of the
local authorities who have control of the street or
highway proposed to be occupied for such purposes. Utah Const. art. XII, § 8.
They [cities] may construct, maintain and operate waterworks, sewer collection, sewer treatment systems, gas works, electric light works, telephone lines or public transportation systems, or
authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the same by others, or purchase or lease
such works or systems from any person or corporation, and they may sell and deliver the surplus
product or service capacity of any such works, not
required by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city. Utah Code Ann. §
10-8-14 (Supp. 1969).
In none of the three cases from Michigan and Nevada
which are cited above and each of which upheld the power
of a municipality to limit by franchise contract the license
taxes payable by a public utility, was there any clearer
statutory or constitutional provisions evident from which
such power could be found than those set forth above.

C.

Michigan Cases

The pertinent statutory provision in the two Michigan cases of City of Detroit v. Detroit City Ry., supra,
and Detroit Citizens' St. Ry. v. Common Council of City of
Detroit, supra, provided that a company organized under
the organic act of which such provision was a part could
not construct a railway in any street " . . . without the consent of the municipal
authorities of such town or city, and under such
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regulations, and upon such terms and conditions,
as said authorities may from time to time prescribe:
provided, further, that after such consent shall
have been given, and accepted by the company or
corporation to which the same is granted, such
authorities shall make no regulations or conditions
whereby the rights or franchises so granted shall
be destroyed or unreasonably impaired, or such
company or corporation be deprived of the right
of constructing, maintaining, and operating such
railway in the street in such consent or grant
named, pursuant to the terms thereof." 43 N.W.
at 447; 85 N.W. at 106.
As pointed out on page 19 of Appellants' brief, the
Michigan Supreme Court specifically held in Detroit
Citizens' St. Ry. v. Common Council of City of Detroit,
supra, that the above quoted Michigan statutory provision
ffcompelled the [railroad public utility involved in that
case] to submit to such terms in regard to local taxation
as it should be able to make with the city." 85 N.W. at
106 (emphasis added).
Although the discussion by Salt Lake City in its
brief in respect to the two Michigan cases is otherwise a
mass of confusion to Appellants, it does appear clear that
the brief of Salt Lake City goes along with the Michigan
Supreme Court and asserts that the above quoted Michi·
gan statutory provision gave the City of Detroit "ex·
pressly and unequivocally" the power to limit its taxing
power when granting a franchise to a public utility. On
the other hand, Salt Lake City maintains that Section 8
of Article XII of the Utah Constitution and Section
10-8-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, both of which are
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quoted above, are inadequate to confer a similar power
on Respondent. The asserted distinction is untenable.
The language in the said Michigan statutory provision
which Salt Lake City asserts distinguishes it from the said
Utah Constitutional and statutory provisions is the following language:
" . . . [A]fter such consent shall have been
given, and accepted by the company or corporation to which the same is granted, such authorities [local or municipal] shall make no regulations or conditions whereby the rights or franchises so granted shall be destroyed. . . ." 43
N.W. at 447; 85 N.W. at 106.
Such language, however, says nothing more than and, in
fact, is not as broad as the impairment of contract clauses
of the Utah and United States Constitutions.

D.

Nevada Case

The "in lieu" provision in the utility franchise contract in City of North Las Vegas v. Central Telephone Co.,
supra, was upheld in light of a statutory provision in the
charter of North Las Vegas which granted the city only
the right "to engage in public utilities businesses or issue
franchises for the same." 460 P.2d at 836. Such statutory
provision is certainly no broader than those Utah statutory
and constitutional provisions pertaining to Respondent's
power to contract with public utilities to obtain the necessary public services rendered thereby.
The attempt in the brief of Salt Lake City to dis' case at bar on the
tinguish the Nevada case from the
9

ground that the City of North Las Vegas was trying to
increase an agreed upon franchise privilege fee, is totally
without merit. The Nevada Supreme Court never once
mentioned franchise fees in its opinion and specifically
stated in a footnote:
NRS 268.095 authorizes a city to impose a
license tax "for revenues or for regulation, or
both." Consequently, we regard as immaterial the
fact that the one percent charge under the franchise was for regulation, whereas the five percent
charge under the later ordinance was for revenue.
In each instance the charge was a license tax within the statute. 460 P.2d at 836.
Furthermore, the suggestion in the brief of Salt Lake
City that the Nevada Supreme Court did not mention or
discuss the issue of a city's power to limit its taxing power
by franchise contract is patently false. The court stated:
Arguing by analogy to cases involving the
power of eminent domain and the police power,
the City urges that the power to tax is likewise an
essential attribute of sovereignty . . . and is inalienable either by statute or contract. The analogy is not sound since the eminent domain and
police power cases do not concern themselves with
the constitutional prohibitions against the impairment of the obligation of contracts. 460 P.2d at
836.
E.

Cases Cited by Salt Lake City and Respondent

As authority for the proposition that Section 8 of
Article XII of the Utah Constitution is inadequate to constitute an authorization of Respondent to limit by fran-
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chise contract with a public utility Respondent's power
to impose a license tax against the public utility, the brief
of Salt Lake City cites the following cases: Salt Lake City
v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 52 Utah 210, 173 P. 556,
(1918); see also Murray City v. Utah Light & Traction
Co., 56 Utah 437, 191 P. 421 (1920). The brief of Salt
Lake City states at page 7 thereof:
These cases specifically held that this Constitutional provision [Utah Constitution, art. XII,
§ 8] did not give the cities the power, either expressly or by implication, to ever fix utility rates
by Franchise Ordinance.
This is a grossly inaccurate and misleading statement
of the holdings in such cases. In the Salt Lake City v.
Utah Light & Traction Co. case, Salt Lake City and Murray City had entered into franchise contracts with Utah
Light & Traction Co. wherein the rates of fare that Utah
Light & Traction Co. was authorized to charge and collect
in respect to its railway system were agreed upon and
fixed. The said company made application to the Public
Utilities Commission for permission to increase the fares
for transportation on its railway system above the rates
authorized by the franchise contracts. The Public Utilities
Commission granted the permission requested.
By writ of review to the Utah Supreme Court, Salt

Lake City, Murray City and others challenged the authority of the commission to allow an increase in the rates
beyond those set in the franchise agreements. The cities
argued that Section 8 of Article XII of the Utah Constitution gave them authority to fix and agree to the fare
11

rates in the franchise contracts and that the determination
by the Public Utilities Commission granting Utah Light &
Traction Co. permission to increase the rates beyond those
set in the franchise agreements was in violation of the
impairment of contract clauses of the Utah and United
States Constitutions.
Upholding the determination by the Public Utilities
Commission which increased the rates beyond those set
in the franchise agreements and in reply to the cities' con·
stitutional objection and argument against such determination, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
This objection has often been made in cases
where either the city or the street car company has
sought relief from a rate fixed by franchise ordinances like those in question here. It should be ob·
served, however, that where the controversy has
arisen between the contracting parties merely, and
in ordinary actions or proceedings, the courts have
usually compelled compliance with the provisions
of the franchise ordinances treating them as con·
tracts. Where, however, as here, the application
was made to Utilities Commissions in pursuance of
a legislative act, the courts have, with few excep·
tions, held that a constitutional or statutory pro·
vision prohibiting the Legislature from passing
laws authorizing the construction and operation
of street railways in cities without the consent of
the local authorities does not authorize such auth·
orities to fix rates which may not be changed by
the Legislature or by a utilities commission creat·
ed for that purpose. In other words, it is univers·
ally held that the regulation and fixing of rates is
a governmental function, that is, a legislative
function, which will not be deemed to have been
surrendered by the sovereign state unless it has
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been done in clear and unequivocal terms. A mere
cursory reading of section 8 of the Constitution,
which we have before quoted, shows that no express right is conferred upon the local authorities
of this state to enter into any contract respecting
the fixing of rates. True it is that in determining
the conditions upon which street railways may be
constructed and operated within the cities the local
authorities may determine the fares that may be
charged and collected. The authority to do that is,
however, merely implied, and there is nothing in
the Constitution which prohibits the Legislature
from exercising its prerogative in changing the
rates of fare in case they are found to be unreasonable, unfair, or oppressive as against the public on
the one hand and unfair or unjust, or confiscatory,
as against the railway company upon the other.
52 Utah at 217-218, 173 P. at 559 (emphasis added).
The court also stated later in its opinion that:

It is now settled law that so long as the state
does not interfere the rates agreed upon between
the cities and the street railway companies in the
franchise ordinances are binding and enforceable.
Neither party, without the consent of the other,
may disregard any rate that is agreed upon between
them. 52 Utah at 223, 173 P. at 561 (emphasis
added).
It can be clearly seen from the above quotations
that said case, if relevant, constitutes authority and support for Appellants' position.
Having failed in Salt Lake City v. Utah Light &
Traction Co., supra, to have the rates which said company
could charge held within the limits of the franchise agree-
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ment, Murray City brought an action to have said company's rights under the franchise agreement forfeited because it was charging fares which, although authorized
by the Utah Public Utilities Commission, were in excess
of the limits in the franchise agreement. Murray City v.
Utah Light & Traction Co., supra, is merely a case which
denied Murray City relief in such action and is of little
significance to the case at bar.
Appellants reply to most of the cases and authorities
cited and relied on by Respondent is contained in the
Record as document number 8 entitled "PLAINTIFFS'
REPLY MEMORANDUM." Accordingly, Appellants
will not burden this brief with such reply except to
state that such cases and authorities and also those
cited by Salt Lake City in its brief are distinguishable on
the ground that none of them deal by way of holding and
only one of them deals by way of dictum (Portland v.
Portland Ry., Light and Power Co., 80 Ore. 271, 156 P.
1058 (1916)) with a provision in a franchise contract
limiting the extent to which a municipality can increase
the non-property taxes imposed upon a utility.
Furthermore, it is significant that the broad dictum
from Portland v. Portland Ry., Light and Power Co.,
supra, which finds such prominence at pages 11 and 12 of
Respondent's brief, was taken from a Missouri property
tax case which invalidated a contractual limitation on a
city's power to impose property taxes on the grounds that
the Missouri Constitution provided that "No property,
real or personal, shall be exempt from taxation" and "All
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property subject to taxation ought to be taxed in proportion to its value" with the word "ought" being held mandatory. State v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R., 75 Mo. 208,
at 212 (1881). Property tax authorities are sui generis and
have no application by way of analogy or otherwise to the
case at bar because of the special requirements of uniformity which exist in connection with such tax. As mentioned
in Appellants' first brief, the power to exempt and create
non-uniformity in respect to occupation or license taxes is
inherent in Respondent's power to classify under Section
10-8-80 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Lockhart v.
American Mutual Life Ins. Co., 194 S.W. 2d 285, at 289
(Tex. Civ. App. 1946); see, also, Salt Lake City v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 P. 523 (1908).
CONCLUSION
A careful reading of the authorities cited by all of
the parties to this controversy can only lead to the following legal conclusions:
1. Constitutional and statutory authority existed for
Ogden City to enter into franchise agreements with the
three Appellants and to negotiate all of the terms and
conditions thereof including the limitations or exemptions as to future taxation.
2. The franchise agreements entered into between
Ogden City and Appellants clearly and unequivocally
provide for a franchise fee "in lieu" of further non-ad
valorem taxation by the city.
15

3. The additional Utility Revenue Tax enacted by
Ogden City and the similar ordinance enacted by Salt Lake
City, as noted in its breif, were an illegal and unjustifi.
able violation of these franchises.
4. The Additional Utility Revenue Tax should
therefore be declared invalid by this court as an unlawful
impairment of Appellants' franchise agreements.
Respectfully submitted,
David E. Salisbury
Alan F. Mecham
Van Cott, Bagley,
Cornwall & McCarthy
Suite 300
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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